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By global standards, the U.S. has a relatively low level of religious nationalism, but it stands out from other high-income countries
Pew Research Center conducted this survey to examine the role of religion in public life in 36 countries across the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East-North Africa region, North America and sub-Saharan Africa. The countries have a variety of historically predominant religions, including Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam and Judaism.
For non-U.S. data, this report draws on nationally representative surveys of 41,503 adults conducted from Jan. 5 to May 22, 2024. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Surveys were conducted face-to-face in Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ghana, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey. In Australia, we used a mixed-mode, probability-based online panel.
In the United States, we surveyed 12,693 adults from Feb. 13 to 25, 2024. Most of the respondents (10,642) are members of Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel recruited through national random sampling of residential addresses, which gives nearly all U.S. adults a chance of selection.
The remaining U.S. respondents (2,051) are members of three other panels: the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, the NORC Amerispeak Panel and the SSRS Opinion Panel. All three are national survey panels recruited through random sampling (not “opt-in” polls). We used these additional panels to ensure that the survey would have enough Jewish and Muslim respondents to be able to report on their views.
Additional survey questions were asked on a follow-up survey conducted from April 1 to 7, 2024, among 3,600 ATP members who had previously participated in the February survey.
The U.S. data is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education, religious affiliation and other categories. Read more about the ATP’s methodology.
Throughout the report, we analyze respondents’ attitudes based on where they place themselves on an ideological scale, their support for populist parties, their religious identification, their educational attainment, their income, and whether they live in high- or middle-income countries. For more on each of these measures, visit the methodology.
Religious nationalism index
In this report, we classify some people as “religious nationalists.” Scholars do not fully agree on how to define religious nationalism, and the challenge is even more complicated when one tries to study the concept in multiple countries – and for multiple religious groups – concurrently. For example, scholars who measure Christian nationalism in the U.S. may consider whether the government should allow prayer in public schools, while those measuring Hindu nationalism in India may consider whether the government should regulate the protection of cows, which are sacred to many Hindus.
For the purpose of making cross-national comparisons, we focused on two concepts in our definition of religious nationalism:
- How important people think identifying with the country’s historically predominant religion is for belonging – e.g., for being “truly” part of the country’s nationality
- The role people want religion to play in their country’s leader and laws
We measured these two concepts among followers of each country’s historically predominant religion using four questions. For more information on how we designed our religious nationalism index and assessed its statistical reliability, go to the methodology.
This analysis was produced by Pew Research Center as part of the Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, which analyzes religious change and its impact on societies around the world. Funding for the Global Religious Futures project comes from The Pew Charitable Trusts and the John Templeton Foundation (grant 63095). This publication does not necessarily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation.
Here are the questions used for this report, along with responses, and the survey methodology.
In many countries, religion and politics are deeply intertwined. The belief that a country’s historically predominant religion should be a central part of its national identity and drive policymaking is sometimes described as “religious nationalism.”
A wide range of movements have been described as religious nationalism, including in India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi has campaigned and governed on the idea that Hindu faith and culture should shape government policies; and in Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is backed by a coalition that includes ultra-Orthodox and national religious parties.
But there is no universally accepted definition of religious nationalism, leaving lots of room for debate over who is, say, a Christian nationalist or a Hindu nationalist. This has made it difficult to assess how common such views are around the world.
To help fill this gap, Pew Research Center set out to measure – in an impartial, consistent way – what share of people in different countries view the dominant religious tradition as central to their national identity, want their leaders to share their religious beliefs, and want religious teachings to guide their laws.
We asked four key questions in nationally representative surveys of nearly 55,000 people, conducted from January to May 2024 in three dozen countries:
- How important is belonging to the historically predominant religion to being truly part of your national identity? (For example, how important is being a Muslim to being truly Indonesian, or being a Christian to being truly American?)
- How important is it to you for your national leader to share your religious beliefs?
- How much influence do you think the historically predominant religion’s sacred text should have on the laws of your country? (For example, how much influence should the Quran have on the laws of Turkey, or should the Bible have on the laws of Italy?)
- When the sacred text conflicts with the will of the people, which should have more influence on the laws of your country? (This follow-up question was asked only of respondents who answered the previous question by saying that the sacred text should have a “fair amount” or “great deal” of influence on their country’s laws.)
For this report, we define “religious nationalists” as people who identify with the historically predominant religion (also often the majority religion) and take a strongly religious position on all four of these questions.
In Turkey, for example, a religious nationalist would be a Muslim who says …
- Being a Muslim is very important to being truly Turkish;
- And it is very important that Turkey’s president shares their religious beliefs;
- And the Quran should have at least a fair amount of influence over Turkey’s laws;
- And when the Quran conflicts with the will of the people, the Quran should have more influence.
In Israel, a religious nationalist would be a Jew who says …
- Being a Jew is very important to being truly Israeli;
- And it is very important that Israel’s prime minister shares their religious beliefs;
- And Jewish scripture should have at least a fair amount of influence over Israel’s laws;
- And when Jewish scripture conflicts with the will of the people, Jewish scripture should have more influence.
In the United States, a religious nationalist would be a Christian who says …
- Being a Christian is very important to being truly American;
- And it is very important that the U.S. president shares their religious beliefs;
- And the Bible should have at least some influence over U.S. laws;
- And when the Bible conflicts with the will of the people, the Bible should have more influence.
Using this definition, the prevalence of religious nationalism varies widely across the 35 countries where we asked all four of these questions. Fewer than 1% of adults surveyed meet the criteria in Germany and Sweden, compared with more than four-in-ten in Indonesia (46%) and Bangladesh (45%).
In this global perspective, the U.S. does not stand out for especially high levels of religious nationalism.
Just 6% of U.S. adults are religious nationalists by the combination of these four measures, about the same level as several other countries surveyed in the Americas, such as Chile (6%), Mexico (8%) and Argentina (8%).Canada has a relatively low share of religious nationalists (3%), while Colombia (12%), Brazil (13%) and Peru (17%) have somewhat higher shares.
How we asked about different religions and religious texts
We asked people in 36 countries about the importance of being a member of a particular religion as well as the influence of specific religious texts on their national laws.
In each country, we selected the historically predominant religion(s) and corresponding sacred text(s). For example, in the United States, where Christianity has long been the majority religion, we asked about the importance of being a Christian to being truly American and about the influence of the Bible on U.S. laws. In Thailand, where the vast majority of the population is Buddhist, we asked about the importance of being a Buddhist to being truly Thai. And, because the concept of “religious texts” is somewhat more relevant in Western religious traditions, we asked about a comparable concept: the influence of Buddhist dharma on the country’s laws.
In Japan, Nigeria and South Korea, we asked all respondents separately about two religions and the influence of their religious texts. In Japan, we asked about Buddhism and Buddhist dharma as well as Shinto and Shinto teachings. A significant portion of the population there identifies as Buddhist, but Shinto has long been tied to national identity, and a quarter of Japanese adults say they feel a personal connection to the Shinto way of life.
In Nigeria, where large shares of the population identify as either Christian or Muslim, we asked about both of those religions, and about the influence of the Bible and the Quran. In South Korea, because sizable shares identify as either Christian or Buddhist, we asked about both religions, and about the Bible and Buddhist dharma.
The questions about the Quran were not asked in Tunisia, so that country is excluded from our analyses of religious nationalism and the influence of religious texts.
Here is a list of the religions and religious texts asked in each country:
| Religion | Religious text | Country |
|---|---|---|
| Christianity | Bible | United States, Canada, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, UK, Australia, Philippines, South Korea, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru |
| Islam | Quran | Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria, Turkey, Tunisia |
| Buddhism | Buddhist dharma | Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Thailand |
| Hinduism | Hindu teachings | India |
| Judaism | Jewish scripture | Israel |
| Shinto | Shinto teachings | Japan |
How this survey’s findings relate to other measures in the U.S.
There are many ways to define religious nationalism. In the U.S., previous Pew Research Center surveys have asked numerous questions about “Christian nationalism” and separation of church and state. A February 2024 survey, for example, found that 5% of U.S. adults have heard of Christian nationalism and view it favorably. And 13% said the federal government should declare Christianity the official religion of the United States.
Here’s how religious nationalists in the U.S. – as defined in the global survey – answer some of these related questions:
- 53% of religious nationalists think the federal government should declare Christianity the official religion of the United States. Another 40% of religious nationalists think the federal government should promote Christian values but not declare Christianity the official religion. Only 4% of religious nationalists think the federal government should neither declare Christianity the official religion nor promote Christian values. By contrast, just 15% of U.S. Christians who are not religious nationalists want Christianity to be the official religion of the United States.
- 84% of religious nationalists in the U.S. think liberals who are not religious have gone too far in trying to keep religious values out of the government and public schools. About six-in-ten Christians who are not religious nationalists (61%) say the same.
Ultimately, more Americans may support individual policies sometimes associated with Christian nationalism than the 6% classified as religious nationalists in this report. This stems from the high bar of needing to take a specific position on all four measures included in our index to be classified as a religious nationalist.
For more on religious nationalism in the U.S., read these Center publications:
However, the U.S. does stand out when compared with other high-income countries, particularly on questions about religious texts. U.S. adults are more likely than people in any other high-income country surveyed to say the Bible currently has either a great deal or some influence over the laws of their country (in other countries, people were asked about other texts).
And the U.S. public is also more inclined than people in other high-income countries to say that the Bible should have that kind of influence (again, relative to the sacred texts asked about in other places).
Americans are also among the most likely of any high-income public to:
- Describe a religious identity (in this case, being a Christian) as very important to truly sharing in the national identity (being American)
- Say it’s very important for their country’s political leader to have strong religious beliefs
Differences between wealthy and less wealthy countries
Why high- and middle-income countries?
Decades of scholarship have explored the relationship between economic development and secularization. One influential notion argues that as societies get wealthier and people feel more secure, religion and religious values become less important in people’s lives and they become more supportive of secular-rational values.
While secularization theory has many detractors and continues to be debated, the general pattern – that wealthier countries tend to see belief in God as less important for morality and that wealthier countries have lower rates of prayer – is one we have observed in our data for decades.
As a result, we analyze the data in this report in part according to each country’s income status, using high- and middle-income categories from the World Bank. The high-income countries have larger percentages of people who are religiously unaffiliated (atheist, agnostic or “nothing in particular”). They are also more likely than middle-income countries to have:
The survey shows that, in general, high-income countries differ sharply from middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank) when it comes to public attitudes about religion.
People in middle-income countries are more likely than people in richer countries to say:
- Religion does more good than harm for society
- Religion encourages tolerance rather than intolerance
- Religion does not encourage superstitious thinking
Jump to Chapter 1 for more on how people around the world view religion’s role in society.
These differences are related to levels of religiousness. People who live in middle-income countries are more likely than people in high-income countries to have a religious affiliation, to pray regularly and to say religion is important in their lives.
Religious people tend to favor a role for religion in public life. So it stands to reason that in countries where more people follow a religion, religion is more likely to be seen as a positive influence in society.
For example, in Bangladesh – where about nine-in-ten adults are Muslim – 94% say religion mostly helps society. But in Sweden – where fewer than half of adults surveyed (47%) have a religious affiliation – 42% say religion is helpful.
People in middle- and high-income countries also differ over the role they think religion should play in public life.
For example, in many middle-income countries, majorities want religious texts like the Bible or the Quran to have either a great deal or a fair amount of influence on their country’s laws. By contrast, in most high-income countries surveyed, only a minority of adults want religious texts to play this role.
In some wealthier countries, people also tend to prioritize the will of the people over religious texts when the two conflict. In middle-income countries, the opposite is true.
Jump to Chapter 4 for more on views of the role religious texts can and should play.
People in middle-income countries are also more likely than those in high-income countries to say it’s very important for the leader of their country to have religious beliefs that are the same as their own (and to have strong religious beliefs, period).
Jump to Chapter 2 for more on views of national leaders and their religious traits.
Religion plays more of a role in national identity in the middle-income countries than the high-income countries surveyed. While comparatively few people in most high-income countries say that sharing the country’s historically predominant religion is very important for being “truly” part of that nation, half or more in most middle-income countries see religion as a key part of national belonging.
Jump to Chapter 3 for more on religion and national identity.
People in middle-income countries are also more likely to be religious nationalists. Religious nationalists do not make up a majority of the population in any country surveyed. But in 13 of the 17 middle-income countries surveyed (since Tunisia is not included in our analysis of religious nationalism), there are double-digit shares of religious nationalists. These shares reach around a third or more in Kenya (32%), Malaysia (38%), Bangladesh (45%) and Indonesia (46%).
In most high-income countries, there are fewer religious nationalists. Indeed, in nine of the 18 high-income countries surveyed, 1% or less of the public meets the criteria. While the shares are somewhat higher in a few countries – 9% in Greece and Israel, for example – in no high-income country do religious nationalists make up a double-digit percentage of the overall public.
Demographics of religious nationalism
In many countries, people who pray daily are more likely than those who pray less frequently to be religious nationalists (under the definition used for this report). For example, in India, 27% of people who say they pray at least once a day are religious nationalists, compared with 17% of those who pray less frequently.
Older people in some countries are somewhat more likely than younger people to be religious nationalists. In Greece, 13% of people ages 50 and older are religious nationalists, compared with 8% of those ages 35 to 49 and only 1% of adults under 35.
In many countries, people with lower levels of education are also somewhat more likely to be religious nationalists than those with higher levels of education. In Kenya, 38% of people with less than a secondary degree are religious nationalists, compared with 22% of those with a secondary degree or more education.
In a few countries, people with lower incomes are more likely than those with higher incomes to be religious nationalists. This is the case in Brazil, where 17% of respondents with incomes at or below the median are religious nationalists, compared with 9% of those with higher incomes.
In addition, people who place themselves on the ideological right are more likely to be religious nationalists than those in the center or on the left in many countries where the survey asked about political ideology. In Poland, for example, 8% of people on the right are religious nationalists, compared with 1% or fewer in the center and on the left.
In Europe, people with favorable views of several right-wing populist parties are also somewhat more likely than people with unfavorable views of those parties to be religious nationalists. (For more on how these parties were defined, refer to the Appendix.) Returning to the example of Poland, 10% of adults who hold a favorable view of the Law and Justice party (PiS) are religious nationalists, compared with 1% of those who see PiS unfavorably.
(Of course, in the case of ideology and party favorability, the relationship could also be reversed. That is, people who hold certain beliefs about religious nationalism may be more likely to have favorable views of specific right-wing populist parties or to place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum than those who do not hold those beliefs.)
In Israel, Haredi and Dati Jews (33%) are much more likely than Masorti Jews (5%) and Hiloni Jews (1%) to be religious nationalists. (Because of sample size considerations, we combine Haredim and Datiim for analysis in this report.)
Jewish religious groups in Israel: Haredim, Datiim, Masortim and Hilonim
Nearly all Israeli Jews identify as either Haredi (commonly translated as “ultra-Orthodox”), Dati (“religious”), Masorti (“traditional”) or Hiloni (“secular”). The spectrum of religious observance in Israel – on which Haredim are generally the most religious and Hilonim the least – does not always line up perfectly with Israel’s political spectrum.
On some issues, including those pertaining to religion in public life, there is a clear overlap: Haredim are furthest to the right, and Hilonim are furthest to the left, with Datiim and Masortim in between. But on other political issues, including those related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and views of the United States, differences between religious groups do not always mirror those between people at different points on the ideological spectrum.
Because of sample size considerations, we combine Haredim and Datiim for analysis in this report.
For more information on the different views of these religious groups, read the Center’s 2016 deep dive on the topic, “Israel’s Religiously Divided Society.”
Can states have a religious character and be democratic?
In a number of countries with sizable Muslim and Jewish populations, we also asked whether their country can be both democratic and a Muslim or Jewish country.
In countries with Muslim majorities, most do think the state can be both democratic and Muslim. The shares who believe this are particularly high in Bangladesh (86%), Tunisia (82%) and Malaysia (80%). (Islam is the official state religion in Bangladesh and Malaysia, and it was the official religion in Tunisia until 2022).
Slightly smaller majorities in Indonesia (70%) and Turkey (67%) agree that their country can be both Muslim and democratic at the same time. But in Nigeria – where Muslims are not the overwhelming majority of the population – only 40% think Nigeria can be both a Muslim state and a democratic state.
Israel defines itself as “Jewish and democratic,” and indeed, 73% of adults surveyed in Israel agree their country can be both. Only about a quarter say the country cannot be a Jewish state and a democratic state at the same time. Still, there are major differences by religion, as well as among Jewish religious groups.
Jump to Chapter 5 for more on the role religion should play in Muslim- and Jewish-majority countries.
These are among the key findings of a 36-country survey conducted by Pew Research Center in the first five months of 2024. This report includes chapters that explore the following questions:
- What impact do people around the world think religion has on their society? (Chapter 1)
- How important should religion be for a country’s leader? (Chapter 2)
- How important is following a specific religion to national belonging? (Chapter 3)
- Should religious texts influence national laws? (Chapter 4)
- What role should religion play in Muslim- and Jewish-majority countries? (Chapter 5)